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The sacrifice of accuracy

Jason Kitcat, the author of GNU.Free, the only free and open source voting system to be sponsored and supported by the Free Software Foundation, takes a more radical view. He has written "I argue that for any major electronic election to be successful and its result adhered to by the candidates any system used would have to be: Secure, Private, Open, Reliable and Scalable.
Jason Kitcat. When I originally formulated those criteria I felt that free software would allow us to achieve those fundamental goals. Now, after trying to build such a system and having watched others try too, I'm of the opinion that it cannot be done with today's technology." Kitcat abandoned the development of GNU.Free because he became convinced that the problems of electronic voting far outweighed the benefits, but affirms that "if we are forced down the road of e-voting by politicians, there can be no doubt that it should be done using free software."

Kitcat says that "the more I have coded, researched, discussed and read, the more I've realised that rather than encourage the use of electronic voting techniques (even if I only advocate the use of free software) I'm much better off focussing on the dangers all such technologies present to processes such as voting." Voting is best left in the hands of the voters.

Bruce Schneier Similarly, Bruce Schneier, the author of many books on cryptography and computer security takes the view that the use of computer systems can't be separated from the vagaries of those that use the software, the software itself, the hardware, the network that connects the hardware, and the human foibles that inform the use and manufacture of the hardware and the software, and all points between. He concludes that no system can satisfy the security problems presented by voting online.

He argues that the essential attributes required of an online voting system are "anonymity, scalability, speed, audit, and accuracy i.e. “ direct mapping from intent to counted vote", and contends that "in the rush to improve the first four attributes, accuracy has been sacrificed. All of these technologies involve translating the voter's intent in some way; some of them involve multiple translations. And at each translation step, errors accumulate."

Schneier asserts that any electronic voting system requires a paper audit for each vote cast, so that in the event of systems failure a true backup exists by which each vote can be hand counted and verified. He goes so far as to suggest that the best method would be a touch screen terminal that produces a print-out which is then verified by the voter and placed into a sealed ballot box, a duplication of the current system that precludes remote online voting entirely (except as a cosmetic exercise).

Online voting, the casting of votes from remote devices, raises other issues. The arguments in favour of online voting are mostly about convenience. The count is simplified and is conducted electronically with more or less instantaneous returns. The voter can register his or her vote at the time and place that suits. However this depends on some broad assumptions. Each voter is expected to have the means and the technical literacy to take advantage of remote electronic voting, a solution that the poor and uneducated will often be denied, leaving a class divide between those who stand in the rain to vote at a polling station and those who vote online.

The current system of voting, putting a cross against a name in a booth, where no-one can see what you are doing, and inserting your vote through a slot into a locked box, may be "astonishingly quaint" but was designed to eradicate or at least minimise the possibilities of corruption and coercion that existed before the introduction of the secret ballot.

The count in UK elections is supervised by the Electoral Commission, and in theory, your vote is secure. There are logistical problems in getting the voter to the polling booth and the sealed box to the count, but once these are surmounted the secret ballot has some guarantees of authenticity and transparency.

At first glance, online voting would appear to share most of these advantages with the additional benefit of portability. You can vote from wherever you are, at the time and place of your choosing, but there are significant problems that are difficult to monitor.

Next: Between the voter and the count

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