Telnet Data Encryption Option
Author(s): T. Ts'o
This document describes a the telnet encryption option as a generic method of providing data confidentiality services for the telnet data stream. [STANDARDS...
Network Working Group T. Ts'o Request for Comments: 2946 VA Linux Systems Category: Standards Track September 2000 Telnet Data Encryption Option Status of this Memo This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This document describes a the telnet encryption option as a generic method of providing data confidentiality services for the telnet data stream. While this document summarizes currently utilized encryption types and codes, it does not define a specific encryption algorithm. Separate documents are to be published defining implementations of this option for each encryption algorithm. 1. Command Names and Codes ENCRYPT 38 Encryption Commands IS 0 SUPPORT 1 REPLY 2 START 3 END 4 REQUEST-START 5 REQUEST-END 6 ENC_KEYID 7 DEC_KEYID 8 Encryption Types NULL 0 DES_CFB64 1 DES_OFB64 2 Ts'o Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 2946 Telnet Data Encryption Option September 2000 DES3_CFB64 3 DES3_OFB64 4 CAST5_40_CFB64 8 CAST5_40_OFB64 9 CAST128_CFB64 10 CAST128_OFB64 11 Following historical practice, future encryption type numbers will be assigned by the IANA under a First Come First Served policy as outlined by RFC 2434 . Despite the fact that authentication type numbers are allocated out of an 8-bit number space (as are most values in the telnet specification) it is not anticipated that the number space is or will become in danger of being exhausted. However, if this should become an issue, when over 50% of the number space becomes allocated, the IANA shall refer allocation requests to either the IESG or a designated expert for approval. 2. Command Meanings IAC WILL ENCRYPT The sender of this command is willing to send encrypted data. IAC WONT ENCRYPT The sender of this command refuses to send encrypted data. IAC DO ENCRYPT The sender of this command is willing to receive encrypted data. IAC DONT ENCRYPT The sender of this command refuses to accept encrypted data. IAC SB ENCRYPT SUPPORT encryption-type-list IAC SE The sender of this command is stating which types of encryption it will support. Only the side of the connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the SUPPORT command. The current types of encryption are listed in the current version of the Assigned Numbers document . The encryption-type-list may only include types which can actually be supported during the current session. If ENCRYPT is negotiated in conjunction with AUTH the SUPPORT message MUST NOT be sent until after the session key has been determined. Otherwise, Ts'o Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 2946 Telnet Data Encryption Option September 2000 it is impossible to know if the selected encryption type can be properly initialized based upon the type and length of the key that is available." IAC SB ENCRYPT IS encryption-type ... IAC SE The sender of this command is stating which type of encryption to use, and any initial data that is needed. Only the side of the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the IS command to initialize the encryption-type scheme. IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY encryption-type ... IAC SE The sender of this command is continuing the initial data exchange in order to initialize the encryption-type scheme. Only the side of the connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the REPLY command. IAC SB ENCRYPT START keyid IAC SE The sender of this command is stating that all data following the command in the data stream will be be encrypted via the previously negotiated method of data encryption. Only the side of the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the START command. The keyid is a variable length field. It is used by various encryption mechanisms to identify which encryption key is to be used, when multiple encryption keys might be known on either side of the connection. The keyid field is encoded with the most significant byte first, and a keyid value of zero is reserved to indicate the default encryption key (this would typically be an encryption key derived during authentication, with the AUTHENTICATION option). The keyid field must be at least one byte long. The only valid values for "keyid" will be those that have been received in a DEC_KEYID command. IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE The sender of this command is stating that all data following the command in the data stream will not be encrypted. Only the side of the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the END IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-START keyid IAC SE The sender of this command requests that the remote side begin encryption of the telnet data stream. Only the side of the connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the REQUEST-START command. The keyid is only advisory, and my be omitted. Ts'o Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 2946 Telnet Data Encryption Option September 2000 IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-END IAC SE The sender of this command requests that the remote side stop encryption of the telnet data stream. Only the side of the connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the REQUEST-END command. IAC SB ENCRYPT ENC_KEYID keyid IAC SE The sender of this requests that the remote side verify that "keyid" maps to a valid key; or verifies that the "keyid" received in a DEC_KEYID command is valid. If keyid is omitted, it implies that there are no more known keyids, and that the attempt to find a common keyid has failed. Only the side of the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the ENC_KEYID command. IAC SB ENCRYPT DEC_KEYID keyid IAC SE The sender of this requests that the remote side verify that "keyid" maps to a valid key on the remote side; or verifies that the "keyid" received in a ENC_KEYID command is valid. If keyid is omitted, it implies that there are no more known keyids, and that the attempt to find a common keyid has failed. Only the side of the connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the DEC_KEYID command. 3. Default Specification The default specification for this option is WONT ENCRYPT DONT ENCRYPT meaning there will not be any encryption of the Telnet data stream. 4. Motivation The Telnet protocol has no form of protection from some intervening gateway looking at IP packets as they travel through the network. This is especially dangerous when passwords are sent as clear text over the network. This option provides a method for encrypting the data stream. 5. Implementation Rules Once the Encryption option is in effect, all data in the negotiated direction, including TELNET options, is encrypted. Encryption begins with the octet of data immediately following the "IAC SB ENCRYPT START encryption-type IAC SE" command. Encryption ends after the "IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE" command. Ts'o Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 2946 Telnet Data Encryption Option September 2000 WILL and DO are used only at the beginning of the connection to obtain and grant permission for future negotiations. The ENCRYPT option must be negotiated in both directions. Once the two hosts have exchanged a WILL and a DO, the sender of the DO ENCRYPT must send a ENCRYPT SUPPORT command to let the remote side know the types of encryption it is willing to accept. In the request, a list of supported encryption schemes is sent. Only the sender of the DO may send a list of supported encryption types (IAC SB ENCRYPT SUPPORT encryption-type-list IAC SE). Only the sender of the WILL may actually transmit encrypted data. This is initiated via the "IAC SB ENCRYPT START IAC SE" command, and terminated via the "IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE" command. If a START is received, and then a second START is received before receiving an END, the second START is ignored. If the sender of the DO would like the remote side to begin sending encrypted data, it can send the "IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-START IAC SE" command. If the sender of the DO would like the remote side to stop sending encrypted data, it can send the "IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-STOP IAC SE" command. If the receiver of the SUPPORT command does not support any of the encryption types listed in the SUPPORT command, it should send an "IAC SB ENCRYPT IS NULL IAC SE" to indicate that there are no encryption types in common. It may also send an IAC WONT ENCRYPT command to turn off the ENCRYPT option. The order of the encryption types in a SUPPORT command must be ordered to indicate a preference for different encryption types, the first type being the most preferred, and the last type the least preferred. If the ENCRYPT option has been enabled, and encrypted data is being received, the receipt of an "IAC WONT ENCRYPT" implies the receipt of an "IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE", e.g., the Telnet data stream is no longer encrypted. Ts'o Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 2946 Telnet Data Encryption Option September 2000 The following example demonstrates the use of the option: Host1 Host2 [ Host1 requests Host2 negotiate the encryption of data that Host2 sends to Host1. Host2 agrees to negotiate the encryption of data that it sends to Host1. ] DO ENCRYPT WILL ENCRYPT [ Host1 requests that Host2 enable encryption as soon as the initialization is completed, and informs Host2 that is supports DES_CFB64. ] IAC SB ENCRYPT REQUEST-START IAC SE IAC SB ENCRYPT SUPPORT DES_CFB64 IAC SE [ Host2 sends the initial feed to Host1. Host1 acknowledges receipt of the IV. ] IAC SB ENCRYPT IS DES_CFB64 CFB64_IV 144 146 63 229 237 148 81 143 IAC SE IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY DES_CFB64 CFB64_IV_OK 103 207 181 71 224 55 229 98 IAC SE [ Host2 is now free to start sending encrypted data, and since a REQUEST-START was received, it enables encryption. ] IAC SB ENCRYPT START IAC SE [ All data from Host2 to Host1 is now encrypted. ] IAC SB ENCRYPT END IAC SE [ All data from Host2 to Host1 is now in clear text again. ] It is expected that any implementation that supports the Telnet ENCRYPT option will support all of this specification. 6. Security Considerations The ENCRYPT option used in isolation provides protection against passive attacks, but not against active attacks. In other words, it will provide protection from someone who is just watching the IP packets as they pass through the network. However, an attacker who is able to modify packets in flight could prevent the ENCRYPT option from being negotiated. This flaw can be remedied by using the Telnet Authentication option alongside the ENCRYPT option. Specifically, setting ENCRYPT_USING_TELOPT in the authentication-type-pair can be used to force that Encryption be negotiated even in the face of active attacks. Ts'o Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 2946 Telnet Data Encryption Option September 2000 In addition, an active attacker can interfere with attempts to start or restart encryption. If encryption is requested by the user, and the client is unable to negotiate enabling or re-enabling encryption, the client must assume that it is being attacked, and MUST immediately terminate the telnet connection. 7. Future directions for Telnet Encryption The specification defines a method for providing data confidentiality to the telnet data stream. Unfortunately all of the encryption mechanism provided under this option do not provide data integrity, because of the complexity of specifying a protocol which provided integrity services efficiently in a stream-oriented protocol. The TELNET START_TLS specification provides a scheme which provides confidentiality, integrity, and compression, and future work for telnet encryption should closely examine using this specification. One promising approach would use the anonymous Diffie-Hellman mode of TLS, followed by the telnet AUTHENTICATION option where the authentication mechanism would include the client and server finished messages computed during the TLS negotiation. 8. Acknowledgments This document was originally written by Dave Borman of Cray Research, with the assistance of Theodore Ts'o of MIT and the IETF Telnet Working Group. 9. References  Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Telnet Protocol Specification", STD 8, RFC 0854, May 1983.  Ts'o, T. and J. Altman, "Telnet Authentication Option", RFC 2941, September 2000.  Alvestrand, H. and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998. 10. Author's Address Theodore Ts'o, Editor VA Linux Systems 43 Pleasant St. Medford, MA 02155 Phone: (781) 391-3464 EMail: email@example.com Ts'o Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 2946 Telnet Data Encryption Option September 2000 11. Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Acknowledgement Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society. Ts'o Standards Track [Page 8]